Personally—and this is where I expect to lose the materialists that I imagine predominate HN—I think we are already in a nightmare scenario with regard to another area: the science of consciousness.
The following seem likely to me:
(1) Consciousness exists, and is not an illusion that doesn't need explaining (a la Daniel Dennett), nor does it drop out of some magical part of physical theory we've somehow overlooked until now;
(2) Mind-matter interactions do not exist, that is, purely physical phenomena can be perfectly explained by appeals to purely physical theories.
Such are the stakes of "naturalistic dualist" thinkers like David Chalmers. But if this is the case, it implies that the physics of matter and the physics of consciousness are orthogonal to each other. Much like it would be a nightmare to stipulate that dark matter is a purely gravitational interaction and that's that, it would be a nightmare to stipulate that consciousness and qualia arise noninteractionally from certain physical processes just because. And if there is at least one materially noninteracting orthogonal component to our universe, what if there are more that we can't even perceive?
I don't think any of this is particularly nightmarish. Just because we don't yet know how this complex system arises from another lower level one doesn't make it new physics. There's no evidence of it being new or orthogonal physics.
Imagine trying to figure out what is happening on someone's computer screen with only physical access to their hardware minus the screen, and an MRI scanner. And that's a system we built! We've come exceedingly far with brains and minds considering the tools we have to peer inside.
Knowing how to build a brain is different from knowing whether that brain has consciousness in the sense that you or I do. The question of consciousness appears to demand new/orthogonal physics because according to our existing physics, there's no sense in which you or should "feel" any differently than a rock does, or a computer does, or Searle's room does, or a Chinese brain does, or the universe as a whole does, etc.
> The question of consciousness appears to demand new/orthogonal physics because according to our existing physics, there's no sense in which you or should "feel" any differently than a rock does,
I don't believe in the hard consciousness problem. Yes, materialist. And yes, it might be that we can never actually put together the path of physical level to how it feels, just like we might never find the fundamental physical rules of the universe. At this time both our positions are belief.
I don't think there is any mystery to what we call "consciousness". Our senses and brain have evolved so we can "sense" the external world, so we can live in it and react to it. So why couldn''t we also sense what is happening inside our brains?
Our brain needs to sense our "inner talk" so we can let it guide our decision-making and actions. If we couldn't remember sentences, we couldn't remember "facts" and would be much worse for that. And talking with our "inner voice" and hearing it, isn't that what most people would call consciousness?
This is not nearly as profound as you make it out to be: a computer program also doesn't sense the hardware that it runs on, from its point of view it is invisible until it is made explicit: peripherals.
You also don’t consciously use your senses until you actively think about them. Same as “you are now aware of your breathing”. Sudden changes in a sensation may trigger them to be conscious without “you” taking action, but that’s not so different. You’re still directing your attention to something that’s always been there.
I agree with the poster (and Daniel Dennet and others) that there isn’t anything that needs explaining. It’s just a question framing problem, much like the measurement problem in quantum mechanics.
another one that thinks they solved the hard problem of consciousness by addressing the easy problem. how on earth does a feedback system cause matter to "wake up"? we are making lots of progress on the easy problem though
This is not as good a refusal as you think it is. To me (and I imagine, the parent poster) there is no extra logical step needed. The problem IS solved in this sense.
If it’s completely impossible to even imagine what the answer to a question is, as is the case here, it’s probably the wrong question to pose. Is there any answer you’d be satisfied by?
To me the hard problem is more or less akin to looking for the true boundaries of a cloud: a seemingly valid quest, but one that can’t really be answered in a satisfactory sense, because it’s not the right one to pose to make sense of clouds.
> If it’s completely impossible to even imagine what the answer to a question is, as is the case here, it’s probably the wrong question to pose. Is there any answer you’d be satisfied by?
I would be very satisfied to have an answer, or even just convincing heuristic arguments, for the following:
(1) What systems experience consciousness? For example, is a computer as conscious as a rock, as conscious as a human, or somewhere in between?
(2) What are the fundamental symmetries and invariants of consciousness? Does it impact consciousness whether a system is flipped in spacetime, skewed in spacetime, isomorphically recast in different physical media, etc.?
(3) What aspects of a system's organization give rise to different qualia? What does the possible parameter space (or set of possible dynamical traces, or what have you) of qualia look like?
(4) Is a consciousness a distinct entity, like some phase transition with a sharp boundary, or is there no fundamentally rigorous sense in which we can distinguish each and every consciousness in the universe?
(5) What explains the nature of phenomena like blindsight or split brain patients, where seemingly high-level recognition, coordination, and/or intent occurs in the absence of any conscious awareness? Generally, what behavior-affecting processes in our brains do and do not affect our conscious experience?
And so on. I imagine you'll take issue with all of these questions, perhaps saying that "consciousness" isn't well defined, or that an "explanation" can only refer to functional descriptions of physical matter, but I figured I would at least answer your question honestly.
(1) is perhaps more of a question requiring a strict definition of consciousness in the first place, making it mostly circular. (2) and especially (3) are the most interesting, but they seem part of the easy problem instead. And I’d say we already have indications that the latter option of (4) is true, given your examples from (5) and things like sleep (the most common reason for humans to be unconscious) being in distinct phases with different wake up speed (pun partially intended). And if you assume animals to be conscious, then some sleep with only one hemisphere at a time. Are they equally as conscious during that?
My imaginary timeline of the future has scientific advancements would lead to us noticing what’s different between a person’s brain in their conscious and unconscious states, then somehow generalize it to a more abstract model of cognition decoupled from our biological implementation, and then eventually tackle all your questions from there. But I suspect the person I originally replied to would dismiss them as part of the easy problem instead, i.e. completely useless for tackling the hard problem! As far as I’m concerned, it’s the hard problem that I take issue with, and the one that I claim isn’t real.
I much agree, especially on the importance of defining what we mean by the word "conscicousness", before we say we cannot explain it. Is a rock conscious? Sure according to some deifinition of the word. Probably everybody would agree that there are different levels of consciousness, and maybe we'd need different names for them.
Animals are clearly conscious in that they observe the world and react to it and even try to proactively manipulate it.
The next level of consciousness, and what most people probably mean when they use the word is human ability to "think in language". That opens up a whole new level, of consciousness, because now we can be conscious of our inner voice. We are conscious of ourselves, apart from the world. Our inner voice can say things about the thing which seems to be the thing uttering the words in our mind. Me.
Is there anything more to consciousness than us being aware that we are conscious? It is truly a wondrous experience which may seem like a hard problem to explain, hence the "Hard Problem of Consciousness", right? But it's not so mysterious if we think of it in terms of being able to use and hear and understand language. Without language our consciousness would be on the level of most animals I assume. Of course it seems that many animals use some kind of language. But, do they hear their "inner voice"? Hard to say. I would guess not.
And so again, in simple terms, what is the question?
This is precisely the matter, I wholeheartedly agree. The metacognition that we have, that only humans are likely to have, is the root behind the millennium-long discussions on consciousness. And the hard problem stems from whatever was left of traditional philosophers getting hit by the wall of modern scientific progress, not wanting to let go of the mind as some metaphysical entity beyond reality, with qualia and however many ineffable private properties.
The average person may not know the word qualia, but “is your red the same as my red” is a popular question among kids and adults. Seems to be a topic we are all intrinsically curious about. But from a physical point of view, the qualia of red is necessarily some collection of neurons firing in some pattern, highly dependent on the network topology. Knowing this, then the question (as it was originally posed) is immediately meaningless. Mutatis mutandis, same exact argument for consciousness itself.
Talking of "qualia" I think feeling pain is a good example. We all feel pain from time to time. It is a very conscious experience. But surely animals feel pain as well, and it is that feeling that makes them avoid things that cause them pain.
Evolution just had to give us some way to "feel", to be conscious, about some things causing us pain while other things cause us pleasure. We are conscious of them, and I don't think there's any "hard question" about why we feel them :-)
How can consciousness have information about the material world if it doesn't interact with it in any way?
And when your fingers type that you experience qualia, are they bullshitting because your fingers have never actually received any signals from your consciousness in any direct or indirect way?
I think the old theory of the planes of existence has a lot of utility here - if you substitute "the dimensionality at which you're analyzing your dataset" for the hermetic concept of "planes of existence" you get essentially the same thing, at least in lower dimensions like one (matter) or two (energy). Mind, specifically a human mind, would be a four dimensional under the old system, which feels about right. No idea how you'd set up an experiment to test that theory though. It may be completely impossible because experiments only work when they work in all contexts and only matter is ever the same regardless of context.
That would certainly be a difficult scenario. But it doesn't seem very likely. For example, consciousness and material systems seem to interact. Putting drugs in your blood changes your conscious experience etc.
Yes, but it doesn't even need mysticism or duality.
There's a more straightforward problem, which is that all of science is limited by our ability to generate and test mental models, and there's been no research into the accuracy and reliability of our modelling processes.
Everything gets filtered through human consciousness - math, experiment, all of it. And our definition of "objective" is literally just "we cross-check with other educated humans and the most reliable and consistent experience wins, for now."
How likely is it that human consciousness is the most perfect of all possible lenses, doesn't introduce distortions, and has no limits, questionable habits, or blind spots?
I've thought about this possibility but come to reject it. If mind-matter interactions did not exist, then matter could not detect the presence of mind. And if the brain cannot detect the mind then we wouldn't be able to talk or write about the mind.
From a physics point of view should be as every effect is caused by previous state. And next tick is always next tick, except quantum bacause has some randomness, but let’s assume it’s a seeded randomness.
I think every tick is predictable from previous state. Inevitable. Therefore I really like how you put it: mind is just spectating.
Yes. That doesn't make it a spectator. The rock is a participant in the predetermined progression.
The "spectator mode" thing you replied to was a totally different concept, where the "mind" is some weird parasite to your brain and you'd walk and talk the same even if you didn't have a "mind". Which is quite a weird idea in my opinion.
The following seem likely to me: (1) Consciousness exists, and is not an illusion that doesn't need explaining (a la Daniel Dennett), nor does it drop out of some magical part of physical theory we've somehow overlooked until now; (2) Mind-matter interactions do not exist, that is, purely physical phenomena can be perfectly explained by appeals to purely physical theories.
Such are the stakes of "naturalistic dualist" thinkers like David Chalmers. But if this is the case, it implies that the physics of matter and the physics of consciousness are orthogonal to each other. Much like it would be a nightmare to stipulate that dark matter is a purely gravitational interaction and that's that, it would be a nightmare to stipulate that consciousness and qualia arise noninteractionally from certain physical processes just because. And if there is at least one materially noninteracting orthogonal component to our universe, what if there are more that we can't even perceive?